Andrew J. Tabler
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Dimasheq Editorial Board
Washington is buzzing with talk of Syria as the next alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, or at least part of such an alternative. As tensions with Iran continue over the reopening of the waterway, policymakers and investors are looking for ways to reduce dependence on one of the world’s most vulnerable maritime chokepoints, which carried around 20–25% of global oil and natural gas trade before the war.
Following the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, President Trump’s decision to engage with Syria’s new leaders revived interest in the country’s long-neglected role as a regional energy transit state. Supporters envision pipelines carrying Iraqi and Gulf oil to Mediterranean ports, gas flowing from Qatar to Europe, and infrastructure networks connecting the Persian Gulf, the eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus. In their view, such projects could diversify global energy routes, strengthen U.S. allies in Europe, and limit Iran’s ability to manipulate energy markets during future crises.
However, while these proposals correctly highlight Syria’s strategic geography, they largely overlook a less attractive reality: pipelines have repeatedly made the country a target for political conflict, military confrontation, and sabotage. This history suggests that pipelines crossing Syrian territory are not merely economic assets, but also strategic vulnerabilities.
This is particularly true of proposals to revive the Kirkuk–Baniyas oil pipeline and build a Qatar–Turkey gas pipeline. Both would pass through vast areas of sparsely populated territory where remnants of ISIS and Iran-backed Shiite militias remain active.
More importantly, many of these plans overlook a fundamental commercial reality: the largest and fastest-growing markets for Gulf energy remain in Asia, not Europe. This limits Syria’s attractiveness as a major export corridor for most Gulf producers.
Pipelines and a Century of Instability
Regional pipelines have played a surprisingly important role in Syria’s political history from the beginning. The U.S.-backed Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPLINE), built to transport Saudi crude oil to the Mediterranean, contributed to Syria’s first of many political coups. After the country gained independence in 1946, President Shukri al-Quwatli resisted U.S. pressure to approve the pipeline’s passage through the Golan Heights, viewing it as a violation of Syrian sovereignty.
In March 1949, Army Chief Husni al-Za’im overthrew Quwatli and quickly approved the construction of the pipeline—only to be overthrown himself months later, as Syria became one of the world’s most politically unstable countries.
Syrian pipeline routes remained vulnerable as regional conflicts erupted in the following decades. During the 1956 Suez Crisis, Israeli forces targeted pumping stations along the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline. In 1982, President Hafez al-Assad shut down the pipeline after aligning with Tehran against Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War. Later, the route briefly returned to prominence following a secret arrangement between Bashar al-Assad and Saddam Hussein that allowed Iraqi oil to flow again through Syria despite the United Nations sanctions imposed on Baghdad. However, U.S. forces bombed the pipeline infrastructure during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, effectively ending its operations.
The Syrian civil war destroyed much of what remained. Beginning in 2011, ISIS and other armed groups systematically targeted the country’s oil and gas infrastructure. Pipelines, pumping stations, and export facilities became military targets, sources of revenue, and symbols of state authority. By the collapse of the regime in 2024, much of Syria’s energy transportation network had been damaged, looted, or rendered inoperable.
The lesson is clear: pipelines crossing Syria have rarely been insulated from domestic or regional crises. More often, they have become victims of political and military conflicts.
The Limits of Reviving Pipelines in the Post-Assad Era
Despite this history, Syria’s new government has generated enthusiasm for reviving regional energy projects. Several important initiatives are already underway:
The Arab Gas Pipeline is once again transporting supplies northward from Jordan into Syria.
Gas from Israeli sources—which in some cases is exchanged for Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) at Aqaba—is helping Syria fuel its power plants and gradually restore electricity generation after years of devastating shortages.
The recently completed Kilis–Aleppo pipeline is transporting Azerbaijani natural gas, financed by Qatar, through Turkey’s pipeline network into northern Syria, further improving energy availability.
An improvised “moving pipeline” has also emerged between Iraq and Syria’s Mediterranean coast.
Reports indicate that tanker trucks are transporting between 140,000 and 220,000 barrels of crude oil per day through Iraqi Kurdistan to the Baniyas refinery and export facilities, helping bypass the Strait of Hormuz.
These projects demonstrate that Syria can play a useful role in regional energy logistics. However, the challenges become apparent when advocates move from practical, incremental projects to grand strategic visions that overlook the country’s history.
For example, reviving the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline would require rebuilding hundreds of miles of infrastructure across sparsely populated territory that remains difficult to secure. The same applies to the long-discussed Qatar–Turkey gas pipeline, which Assad reportedly abandoned in 2011 under pressure from Russia. Both projects would cross large sections of the vast desert region stretching across central and eastern Syria, an area that challenged empires—from the Ottomans to the British—for centuries.
The Assad regime never managed to fully secure it, and the current government faces even greater limitations in its capabilities. Protecting exposed pipeline infrastructure in these areas from sabotage would require extensive security resources, intelligence cooperation, and sustained political stability. None of these conditions currently exists.
These concerns are not limited to international projects. Proposed domestic pipelines connecting energy fields in northeastern Syria to Homs and Baniyas, along with other links, would face many of the same risks.
The Difficult Geography
Security concerns are only part of the challenge. The larger obstacle may be economic.
Much of the enthusiasm surrounding Syrian transit routes assumes that Gulf producers are eager to redirect exports toward Europe. Yet the global center of energy demand is increasingly shifting toward Asia. China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia remain the primary growth markets for Gulf oil and gas, giving producers strong incentives to prioritize export routes serving eastern markets over western ones.
This reality strengthens the appeal of alternatives that bypass the Strait of Hormuz without passing through Syria. Saudi Arabia already has pipeline capacity connecting Gulf production facilities to Red Sea ports, while the United Arab Emirates and Oman provide export routes to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.
For most producers, these options provide access to Asian markets while avoiding many of the risks associated with Syria.
There are exceptions. Iraq’s Kurdistan Region remains geographically constrained between Turkey, Iran, and Baghdad, making access to the Mediterranean through Syria potentially valuable.
Qatar may also show renewed interest in overland routes now that the war with Iran has exposed the vulnerability of LNG exports that depend on uninterrupted navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.
Although a Qatar–Turkey pipeline would be extremely costly and politically complicated, the strategic rationale for diversifying export routes away from traditional corridors has become stronger than it was before the conflict, particularly if Doha succeeds in expanding its presence in European gas markets.
Nevertheless, the broader regional reality remains unchanged: the main markets for Gulf hydrocarbons lie to the east, not the west, limiting Syria’s attractiveness as a major transit corridor.
Washington’s Challenge
The Trump administration and groups of Syrian-American business leaders are right to see a strategic opportunity in Syria.
Their broader vision is based on concepts associated with the “Four Seas Initiative”—a modern proposal to connect the Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea, Mediterranean Sea, and Black Sea through interconnected infrastructure networks. If implemented, such projects could diversify energy transportation routes and reduce Iran’s geopolitical influence.
But before investors commit billions of dollars to pipelines, Syria must become a more stable place to do business.
Washington can help by reducing three categories of risk:
Political risks.
The Trump administration should build on the “communication mechanism” brokered by the United States and established between Syria and Israel in Paris last January, expanding it into a broader framework for withdrawal along the Golan border. This could reduce tensions, create conditions for eventual peace negotiations, and at the same time help ease concerns among energy investors.
Washington should also continue encouraging President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government to broaden political participation. Alawites, Christians, Druze, Kurds, and other minorities make up nearly a quarter of Syria’s population—and including them is not merely a human-rights issue, but a matter of stability. Investors are more likely to commit capital when political systems appear sustainable and representative.
Security risks.
The United States should work with Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Israel, and Gulf partners to improve security along potential energy corridors. Intelligence sharing, border-security cooperation, counterterrorism operations, and infrastructure protection will be essential if major pipeline projects are to move forward. Since the United States withdrew its forces from Syria two months ago, it will need to address this issue through neighboring states.
Without credible security guarantees, securing financing for large-scale energy infrastructure will remain difficult.
Regulatory and governance risks.
Syria continues to suffer from weak institutions, opaque business practices, and widespread corruption inherited from the previous era. Recent disputes within the Syrian Oil Company between CEO Youssef Qablawi and the board of directors, led by Energy Minister Mohammed al-Bashir, have done little to reassure investors.
International energy companies require transparent contracts, predictable regulations, and enforceable legal protections before committing substantial capital. Ultimately, improving governance may prove more important than building the pipelines themselves.
In short, Washington, Damascus, and other actors concerned with Syria’s energy future should keep in mind that geography alone does not create investment. Syria does indeed sit at a crossroads between multiple regions and has genuine potential to become an energy-transit hub in the future. Yet for more than seventy years, pipelines crossing Syria have repeatedly fallen victim to war, political instability, regional competition, and sabotage.
The post-Assad era offers an opportunity to change this history, but doing so will require far more than ambitious maps and optimistic projections.
If Damascus can reduce the risks that plagued previous projects, Syria could indeed emerge as part of a broader solution to the risks exposed by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. If it cannot, investors will likely look for sa
fer alternatives elsewhere, leaving Syria once again watching major regional energy routes pass it by.
