Robert Satloff
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
This historic document offers a once-in-a-generation opportunity to build a genuine peace between Beirut and Jerusalem. Yet progress must be swift and tangible, given the threat posed by Iran and its local allies, who may seek to oppose the agreement violently.
After a rocky start to their fifth round of negotiations and a delay of several hours before the closing ceremony, Lebanon and Israel ultimately signed a “framework agreement” on June 26, thereby going considerably beyond the “declaration of intent” they had been expected to adopt. It is the first agreement between the two neighbors since the short-lived peace agreement of May 1983, and perhaps the most important since their armistice agreement 77 years ago, given its scope, ambition, and potential consequences.
The text of the agreement is divided into fourteen points, a structure that not only echoes the recent U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding, but also appears deliberately designed to offer an alternative path to that memorandum in addressing the Lebanese issue. Here are fourteen observations on those fourteen points:
1. The term “framework agreement” originated in 1978 to describe the two parts of the original Camp David Accords. One evolved into the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, while the other, concerning the Palestinian issue, failed to produce results. The phrase suggests a major step forward, though not a decisive one. The previous four rounds of talks produced statements varying in their level of detail, but implementation of the new framework agreement will likely dominate Israeli-Lebanese diplomacy for the foreseeable future.
2. Media reports have understandably focused on the details of Hezbollah’s disarmament, the Israeli withdrawal, and the establishment of “pilot areas” for Lebanese army deployment. Yet it is important to recognize that the agreement’s central strategic objective is to establish peace between the two countries. The words “peace” and “peaceful” appear ten times in the text, while paragraph 12 obliges both parties to immediately establish “working groups to draft a comprehensive and full peace and security agreement.” This effectively ends any internal Lebanese debate over whether Beirut could limit its diplomatic objectives to narrower goals, such as renewing the bilateral armistice or reaching some form of non-aggression agreement. The objective is now clear: full peace.
3. It is striking that the agreement uses the phrase “irreversible,” one of the strongest expressions in diplomatic language and one that has never previously been used in an Arab-Israeli peace agreement. Yet it appears twice here, in two very different contexts. Paragraph 1 states that “this framework … expresses the determination to achieve irreversible progress toward a comprehensive settlement of all issues between the two countries,” while paragraph 4 states that “the Government of Lebanon reaffirms its firm and irreversible commitment to restoring and exercising full sovereignty over its entire territory.” The verbal parallel highlights the crucial connection between Lebanon’s insistence on full sovereignty and the objective of making peace with Israel.
4. The text contains a certain ambiguity over whether this is a trilateral agreement or a bilateral agreement concluded with U.S. support. Its official title, “Trilateral Framework,” suggests that the United States is an equal partner, while paragraph 1 states that “both countries reaffirm their determination to resolve [all] issues as two sovereign states through direct bilateral negotiations, mediated and supported by the United States.”
Whatever the diplomats ultimately decide on this question, the agreement’s numerous commitments make clear that the American role is indispensable—from negotiation to implementation to defending the process against its opponents (see point 11 below).
5. Peace is the ultimate goal, but the path toward it runs through the core operational principle laid out in paragraph 2: both governments “commit to a reciprocal, phased process with clear conditions, under which the Lebanese Armed Forces will restore effective sovereign authority over the entire territory of Lebanon, subject to verified disarmament of non-state armed groups and dismantling of associated infrastructure, enabling the Israel Defense Forces to progressively redeploy outside Lebanese territory.”
That is the core bargain at the heart of the agreement: as the Lebanese army fulfills its commitment to deploy in designated areas, disarm Hezbollah, dismantle its infrastructure, and prevent it from regrouping there, the Israeli Defense Forces will relinquish control and withdraw, allowing Lebanese civilians to return under “exclusive” Lebanese control.
There is no specific timetable for this process, but its sequence is unmistakably clear. The Israeli withdrawal is neither automatic nor presumed, and Lebanon is not demanding an immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Rather, the redeployment of Israeli forces is viewed as a rolling process whose pace and scope will be determined by the pace and scope of the Lebanese army’s efforts. As the agreement states, only “successful implementation” will enable the Israel Defense Forces to leave.
6. The agreement does not define “disarmament” or “dismantlement,” but the terms are explained in the security annex, whose details were issued later: “taking legal measures against all non-state armed individuals engaged in unauthorized activity, and destroying or rendering inoperable the infrastructure associated with them, including but not limited to weapons, weapons depots, tunnels, and command centers, by those non-state armed groups.”
As the process moves forward, it will be important to monitor whether dismantlement extends to Hezbollah’s weapons factories, drone assembly facilities, training sites, and other military infrastructure, and perhaps also to its communications networks, financial institutions, and command headquarters.
As for disarmament, the security annex does not settle whether the process will be voluntary, coercive, or a combination of both, leaving open various methods of achieving the objective. One particular option, however, has been explicitly ruled out: integrating Hezbollah units into the Lebanese army, an idea that had been gaining support in some circles. Under paragraph 4, Beirut commits to ensuring that non-state armed groups have “no military or security role and no armed capabilities anywhere in Lebanon.”
7. Paragraph 3 states that the “pilot areas” will serve as “a mechanism for phased and verified redeployment operations of the Israel Defense Forces, and for Lebanese army deployments.” Although Lebanon and Israel had agreed on this concept during previous talks, they arrived in Washington last week with sharply different visions of how it should be implemented. Beirut initially proposed that Israeli forces withdraw from a strip along the border, after which displaced Lebanese civilians would return. It was hardly surprising that Israel objected to beginning the process within firing range of its northern towns.
They ultimately settled on two areas farther north within the “area south of the Litani,” with an agreement to add other pilot areas “by mutual consent.”
Within this framework, the security annex requires the two sides to establish an innovative joint initiative, the bilateral “Lebanon Military Coordination Group,” which will “operate around the clock, seven days a week, and manage deconfliction, verification, and comprehensive implementation.” This gradual process, expanding Lebanese army control while disarming Hezbollah and dismantling its infrastructure, is ultimately intended to extend “throughout Lebanon.”
8. While the pilot areas focus on disarming Hezbollah and dismantling its infrastructure in specific geographic zones, Beirut has also undertaken a broader commitment to cut off its financing throughout the country.
The government, as paragraph 11 states, pledges to prevent “the flow of funds to any entity, organization, or individual affiliated with non-state armed groups,” and “explicitly commits to preventing reconstruction funds from flowing to non-state armed groups and entities affiliated with them.” Notably, the United States has joined this commitment as well (see point 11 below).
Precisely defining who is “affiliated” with Hezbollah and what constitutes an “associated entity” will therefore be critically important. Would this include the Council of the South, or the Amal Movement led by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri? What about mayors aligned with Hezbollah in towns south of the Litani? Whatever the answers, the principle adopted here provides a powerful tool for financially strangling the group.
9. One striking implicit feature of the agreement is that both sides repeatedly demonstrate an understanding of the other’s difficulties and challenges, revealing a degree of mutual empathy deeper than that normally found in documents of this kind.
One might imagine that the Israeli government would not care whether Lebanese civilians return to the south, just as the Lebanese government might not care about the condition of Israel’s northern towns. Each would be expected to focus on its own national priorities. Yet the document, remarkably, conveys a sense that these distinct national interests are interconnected. Paragraph 8, for example, states that “the two countries recognize that restoring security in southern Lebanon through the deployment of the Lebanese army, the safe return of its civilian population, and the security of Israeli northern communities are essential to long-term stability and peace.”
It is rare to find such a degree of empathetic understanding in any previous Arab-Israeli peace agreement.
10. Critics of Lebanon’s negotiating skill have seized on paragraph 13, which commits the parties to “undertake good-faith measures demonstrating positive intent, including ceasing all hostile or harmful actions in international political or legal forums, and committing to work toward searching for and returning remains and releasing detainees.”
Specifically, domestic opponents accuse the Lebanese government of surrendering citizens’ right to hold Israel accountable for the hardship, displacement, and deaths resulting from military operations in recent months.
Yet this is a distorted reading of a commitment that serves the interests of both sides. Although it probably means that Lebanon will no longer participate in United Nations Human Rights Council investigations into Israeli actions, it also reassures Lebanese concerns that Israel might support efforts in the U.S. Congress to cut or severely restrict bilateral military assistance to the Lebanese army as punishment for failing to act against Hezbollah.
This paragraph certainly does not mean that Lebanon will suddenly change its position regarding the International Criminal Court case against Israeli officials, or the International Court of Justice case accusing Israel of genocide. That is because Lebanon, like Israel and the United States, has never ratified the Rome Statute and is not a party to the ICC. Nor has Lebanon ever submitted a formal intervention in the genocide case before the ICJ.
11. The U.S. role in the agreement is extensive, as demonstrated by multiple provisions throughout the text. Taken together, they show that the Trump administration has committed to:
– providing “mediation and support” for Israeli-Lebanese diplomacy (paragraph 1);
– supporting the drafting of the security annex (paragraph 2);
– verifying and supporting the pilot-area initiative (paragraph 3);
– leading efforts to mobilize international and Arab support for the process (paragraph 4);
– supporting and participating in a “Military Coordination Group” to ensure implementation (paragraph 7);
– mobilizing international partners to support Lebanon’s reconstruction (paragraph 10);
– working with Lebanon to prevent financial flows to Hezbollah and its affiliates (paragraph 11);
– facilitating Israeli-Lebanese negotiations toward a final peace agreement (paragraph 12).
The agreement further states that “any new U.S. assistance” to Lebanon will be “strictly conditioned on verifiable benchmarks, full transparency, demonstrated results, and ongoing oversight,” conditions that do not necessarily apply implicitly to existing U.S. assistance.
In the published versions of the security annex, Washington’s role appears surprisingly limited, mentioned only in connection with facilitating implementation and mediating disputes. In reality, however, the United States is likely to play a stronger role as the leading party in establishing a “third-party entity agreed upon by both sides” responsible for verifying the “removal of all non-state armed groups and their military infrastructure” from the pilot areas.
All these American commitments lead to two clear conclusions. First, it is the United States—not the United Nations or a group of countries—that shares responsibility with the two parties for implementing the agreement. Second, the Trump administration should move quickly to establish a large interagency team dedicated to fully meeting Washington’s obligations.
12. The agreement’s authors made no attempt to conceal their rejection of the idea that Iran has a legitimate role in shaping Lebanon’s political or security future, in contrast to the implicit message of the recent U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding.
As paragraph 6 states, “the Government of Lebanon rejects the claims of any actor, governmental or non-governmental, to use force on its behalf without its explicit authorization, and reaffirms that any claim by any governmental or non-governmental actor to exercise a military or security role is unlawful under the decisions of the Lebanese government and contrary to Lebanon’s national interests.”
It is therefore unsurprising that Iran’s leading proxies in Lebanon, Hezbollah and Amal, moved to condemn the agreement in the strongest terms. Hezbollah took to the streets, threatening violence against the government, while Berri described the document as “sedition” and boasted of a phone call with his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, demonstrating the close coordination between him and Tehran.
The result is that Lebanon has now become, unmistakably, the central arena for the Islamic Republic’s claims to a broader regional role following its survival of the war against Iran.
13. The courage and determination of the Lebanese government should not be underestimated. The easiest course for President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam would have been to align themselves with Berri, adhere to the U.S.-Iran memorandum’s call for a complete ceasefire, and accommodate Tehran’s demand for an unconditional Israeli withdrawal from all Lebanese territory.
It is true that such a course might have led Washington to suspend its funding for the Lebanese army, but certain countries in the region would probably have filled the gap.
Lebanon’s leaders nevertheless chose a different path. They recognized that much of their public is tired of decades of war and Iranian domination, and they made the bold decision to reject Tehran’s enticements and place their bet on Washington, Israel, and the pursuit of peace.
The road remains long, particularly in implementing the commitment to disarm Hezbollah and dismantle its infrastructure—a promise Lebanese governments have repeatedly made since the Taif Agreement four decades ago. But the outcome may finally be different this time. The decision has been made, and the struggle between supporters and opponents of the agreement has become a zero-sum game.
It is to be hoped that the Israeli government, itself facing adverse domestic political winds, will recognize the value of this moment and act, both rhetorically and practically, as the partner envisioned by this unprecedented agreement.
That includes, among other things, avoiding provocative statements and measures that would further complicate Beirut’s difficult path; close coordination with Lebanese political and security authorities over implementation; and quiet encouragement of international donors to support Lebanon’s reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts.
14. As much as the framework agreement represents a clear success for U.S. diplomacy, and for Secretary of State Marco Rubio in particular, it has also exposed an internal American debate over whether Iran is solely part of the problem in the Middle East or could also be part of the solution.
This debate is often portrayed as a competition between Rubio and Vice President J.D. Vance, the leading advocate of the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding.
As of this writing, President Trump has made no public comment on the Lebanon agreement, although paragraph 14 expresses “deep appreciation” for his “vision and leadership.” This may suggest that he has not yet made up his mind on the issue, which could concern both Israel and Lebanon, despite the reportedly cordial phone call Trump held with Aoun over the weekend.
Conclusion
The Israeli-Lebanese agreement presents a once-in-a-generation opportunity to build genuine peace between these two neighbors, but the road ahead is fraught with risks and remains fragile. With some opponents openly declaring their determination to kill the opportunity in its infancy, progress must be swift and tangible.
Today brought an early positive step, as U.S. Central Command Commander Admiral Brad Cooper visited Beirut to begin coordinating implementation of the security annex with Lebanese Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal. This was a prudent move given the latter’s record of prioritizing “civil peace” over measures to disarm Hezbollah.
Washington should push for further supportive steps, including broader Arab and international backing for the agreement.
Yet nothing can replace the most important missing piece: a warm and public embrace of the agreement by President Trump personally. If delivered skillfully, in the manner that only he can manage, it could give Israeli-Lebanese diplomacy a major boost without undermining the substance of the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding that he negotiated, and without inflaming tensions between his vice president and secretary of state.
