Damascus | At first glance, it may appear that Israeli activity in Syria is concentrated exclusively in the south, given the scale and nature of the attacks there, which intensified following the announcement of the collapse of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement line, with repercussions affecting both the military and political realities. However, a closer examination of Israel’s recent conduct shows that the occupation has moved to “expand” its list of targets, alongside a profound shift in the “function” of its intervention. It is no longer limited to altering the military situation in targeted areas, but has extended into managing the civilian sphere and attempting to control the social environment that could generate any threat. This falls within the framework of promoting the rhetoric of “protecting minorities.”
The exploitation of this narrative, against the backdrop of sectarian violence and massacres allegedly committed by the transitional authorities’ forces in Suwayda, has created a complex social reality in the province, reaching the point where public proposals have emerged calling for the establishment of a buffer zone beyond the 1974 agreement framework, and placing Suwayda under “self-administration” with clear Israeli oversight. Today, it appears that Israeli exploitation of those massacres — which the Syrian coast witnessed a similar version of in March 2025 — has begun extending to the coastal region. Israel is cautiously working to create potential partners among coastal residents, particularly those living abroad, to use them in a conflict it views as long-term, especially in light of competition over influence with Türkiye.
Following the coastal massacres, Israel launched organized media campaigns aimed at “removing” those events from the broader context of the Syrian crisis, while strengthening the Alawites’ sense of “grievance” and the fragility of their position following the fall of the previous regime. Despite the lack of “public” evidence of official coordination between Alawite groups and Israel — apart from limited calls for international protection through discussions on the platform “X” and other interactions with Jewish media figures — recent developments have revealed active behind-the-scenes movement in this direction within the Syrian scene.
According to security sources who spoke to Al-Akhbar, Israel is working, through former Syrian officers, to revive “separatist” rhetoric and promote the idea that what happened on the coast “exceeded what Israel did in Gaza,” with the aim of improving the image of the enemy and suggesting to Alawites that they face a foe “more dangerous than it.” Israel is also seeking to portray Israeli attacks across the country as being directed against the behavior of the ruling authorities, rather than against Syria as a central country in the region. At the same time, it is attempting to frame the conflict as one between Syrian components over the form of the state and governance, away from the context of confrontation with Israel.
According to the same sources, an officer from Israel’s Mossad met earlier this month in the UAE with a former Syrian commander accused by the transitional authorities of leading military efforts on the coast against them. The officer allegedly asked him to work on reorganizing his forces, anticipating any development that Israel might view as an opportunity to alter the situation of the Alawites. Currently, that commander is reportedly transferring monthly sums of money to some members of his group and directing their movements through WhatsApp using foreign numbers that are changed from time to time.
According to special security information obtained by Al-Akhbar, Israel has succeeded in recruiting some young Alawites without their knowledge, by assigning them tasks that appear ordinary on the surface, such as preparing lists of figures who previously worked with Iran and Hezbollah in Syria, assessing the possibility of these figures joining an armed resistance framework against the enemy, and measuring reactions to Israel’s actions in the south. Recruits are reportedly selected based on specific characteristics, including being under the age of 21, having strong academic performance, a wide social network, and the ability to attract peers.
Notably, Israeli practices are not limited to Syrian Alawites but extend to Lebanon and Türkiye as well. This penetration is carried out in a subtle manner that is often difficult for non-specialists to understand, particularly amid efforts by some international “humanitarian” organizations to confine Syria’s transformation to its impact on targeted communities, and to spread the belief that distinctiveness and uniqueness are the first steps toward separation.
According to journalistic investigations reviewed by Al-Akhbar, it was confirmed that a humanitarian organization called “Western Syria Development,” established in Beirut and led by a former Syrian military intelligence general, is attempting to promote the idea of securing “international protection” for Alawites from the United States. Last March, the organization met with several American figures, Republican lawmakers, and the retired Israeli brigadier general Amir Avivi in Washington. During the meeting, Avivi highlighted “Israel’s role in protecting vulnerable populations,” citing what he described as “the wave of violence committed by the Al-Sharaa government against them.”
Returning to the south, some towns in the western Damascus countryside reportedly received messages through the Messenger application from the enemy’s intelligence Unit 504, containing recruitment offers and requests to provide information related to hidden missile storage sites and drone launch platforms.
