Ibrahim Al-Jibeen – The New Arab
Mahmoud Muhareb, university professor, researcher at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, and former Secretary-General of the National Democratic Assembly, spent years meticulously examining Israeli archives, navigating their complexities and ambiguities. His task was often made more difficult by the decisions of various Israeli institutions to repeatedly reclassify archival files—alternately opening or restricting access to them according to what Tel Aviv deemed necessary. Such “necessities” have been particularly abundant whenever Israel’s secret contacts with its Arab surroundings are concerned.
Yet the struggle to uncover a document, analyze its contents, and compare it with corresponding Arab records—equally scarce and originating from states that have yet to establish legal traditions of declassification and public access to national archives—is only one part of the battle. Once a book is published or a study released, another conflict begins: confronting public opinion and prevailing Arab consciousness, where many readers remain committed to idealized portrayals of certain figures, historical periods, and political movements that have been endowed with a near-sacred status, rendering them beyond criticism or even calm discussion.
The platform Al-Araby Plus recently hosted researcher Mahmoud Muhareb on its podcast Lil-Hadith Sila (“Related to the Conversation”), presented by journalist Anas Azraq. The interview provided Muhareb with another opportunity to explain his work and emphasize the importance of studying both secret and public Arab-Israeli relations. As he noted, the future of the Arab region largely depends on the nature of these relations: Will Arab states resist Israel or submit to it? If they submit, will Israel cease its aggression, or will it come to regard large parts of the Arab world as its sphere of influence? Muhareb stressed that this subject is of utmost importance and deserves serious scholarly attention from Arab historians and researchers.
The Battle over Documents
The discussion explored clandestine relationships established between the Jewish Agency and political figures from Syria’s National Bloc, often described as the “mother of independence” because of its role in laying the foundations of the modern Syrian state and leading the struggle for independence. These secret meetings and contacts took place in several locations, including Damascus. Some participants sought to advance political objectives aligned with their own agendas, while others went further, accepting direct support from the Jewish Agency—and later from Israeli intelligence services—in exchange for services rendered.
These contacts occurred during the Palestinian Revolt of 1936–1939, when such interactions were already considered taboo. Their prohibition intensified further, and those involved were increasingly condemned, particularly after the rise of Nasserism. Muhareb traces the origins of this issue to Najib Azoury’s 1905 book The Awakening of the Arab Nation, in which Azoury described two parallel yet conflicting historical phenomena: the awakening of the Arab nation and the Jewish effort to re-establish the ancient Kingdom of Israel on a broad scale. Azoury wrote:
«“The destiny of these two movements is to struggle continuously until one triumphs over the other. The ultimate outcome of the conflict between these two peoples, representing two contradictory principles, will determine the fate of the entire world.”»
Muhareb argues that a file of such significance cannot continue to be avoided while allowing the adversary alone to narrate its history. Arabs, he insists, must develop their own analyses of these events, their details, and their consequences.
Thirty years after the 1948 war, extensive archival material related to the conflict was opened in Israeli repositories, including the Central Zionist Archives, the State Archives, the Haganah Archive, and numerous other collections. This development gave rise to the phenomenon of the “New Historians” in Israel, among them Benny Morris, Ilan Pappé, Avi Shlaim, and Tom Segev. Drawing on Israeli archival documents, these scholars exposed massacres committed against Palestinians and documented the expulsions and acts of destruction that accompanied the establishment of Israel.
Secret Syrian-Israeli Contacts
According to Muhareb, secret Syrian contacts with Israelis predated the establishment of the State of Israel itself. He has examined these relationships in several studies, including Secret Relations Between the Jewish Agency and Syrian Leaders During the Great Palestinian Revolt (2021), later published in English by the University of London through Bloomsbury in 2023.
His research covers prominent figures such as Akram al-Hawrani, one of the three principal founders of the Arab Socialist Ba‘ath Party, as well as Nasib al-Bakri, Fakhri al-Barudi, Jamil Mardam Bey, Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, journalists, and other members of the Syrian National Bloc.
Muhareb emphasizes that he does not accuse anyone of treason. Rather, he presents documented historical facts. He notes that al-Hawrani played a major role in the series of coups that began in Syria in 1949. Later, after becoming Minister of Defense and falling out with Colonel Adib al-Shishakli, al-Hawrani fled to Lebanon in late 1952. From there, he reportedly contacted Israeli officials and expressed a desire to meet them in Paris alongside Kamal Jumblatt.
Muhareb further notes that Syrian President Husni al-Za‘im conducted secret negotiations with Israel in 1949, proposing a comprehensive peace agreement and the resettlement of 300,000 Palestinian refugees in northeastern Syria. Adib al-Shishakli likewise engaged in clandestine talks with Israel. In contrast, Foreign Minister Adel Arslan opposed this trajectory, resigned from office, and publicly denounced al-Za‘im’s dealings with Israel in an interview with Al-Hayat newspaper in August 1949.
Following Shishakli’s rise to power, Syria’s relations with Israel continued through covert channels. Israeli strategy toward Syria, as revealed in archival documents, focused on preventing any Syrian-Iraqi union. Israeli intelligence cooperated extensively with Shishakli, reportedly monitoring the Iraqi embassy in Damascus and providing him with information about opposition activities.
Muhareb argues that after Shishakli thwarted al-Hawrani’s attempted coup in 1952, al-Hawrani escaped to Lebanon and initiated contact with Israel. Israeli archival records indicate that he requested a meeting with an Israeli government representative in Paris.
After Shishakli’s removal from power in February 1954, he himself reportedly met Moshe Sasson, an aide to Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett, at a resort in Geneva in 1956. According to Muhareb, Israeli officials provided him with financial support in the hope that he would organize a coup against Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli and return to power. Sharett later confirmed that Shishakli had received Israeli funds and had infiltrated Syria while preparing a coup planned for 15 July 1956. However, changes in the Syrian military leadership ultimately caused the plan to collapse.
The Jewish Agency and Syrian Independence Leaders
Prior to Syrian independence, the Jewish Agency sought to establish ties with Sultan Pasha al-Atrash through his aide Yusuf al-Aysami. One of its main objectives was to discourage Palestinian Druze from supporting the Palestinian revolt and, ultimately, to encourage their migration.
Muhareb suggests that after sustained efforts by al-Aysami, al-Atrash—like other Syrian leaders, including Jamil Mardam Bey—called during the later stages of the revolt for an end to support for the Palestinian uprising. He attributes many Syrian leaders’ willingness to engage with Zionist representatives to a widespread belief that the Zionist movement possessed significant international influence and could assist Syria’s quest for independence from French colonial rule.
In one meeting between National Bloc leaders and the Jewish Agency, Jamil Mardam Bey reportedly told journalist Israel Epstein that he had never opposed Zionism and had informed French authorities that Syria needed experts, whose assistance could prove beneficial.
Muhareb recounts another episode from November 1937, when severe floods struck Syria, causing substantial loss of life and property. David Pinto, head of the Jewish community committee in Damascus, proposed that the Jewish Agency offer condolences and financial assistance to flood victims as a means of strengthening relations with Syrian authorities. Concerned that the Syrian government might reject the gesture, agency officials sought clarification from Prime Minister Jamil Mardam Bey, who approved the initiative. Consequently, Moshe Shertok (later Moshe Sharett), head of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, sent a letter of condolence accompanied by a cheque worth 2,000 Syrian pounds. Mardam Bey accepted the donation and sent a formal letter of thanks.
Alongside these high-level contacts, relationships were cultivated with less prominent but influential figures. Journalist Abdullah Abboud reportedly worked as a paid agent for the Jewish Agency. Several Syrian Jews also cooperated with the agency, including Syrian parliamentarian Yusuf Linyado, physician David Pinto, and David Lozia, who assisted in Jewish migration operations to Palestine.
Regarding Nasib al-Bakri, Muhareb states that financial difficulties led him to seek compensation for his services. The Jewish Agency subsequently paid him for reports on Syrian affairs and the Palestinian revolt, including information on individuals supporting Palestinian resistance fighters. His brother, Fawzi al-Bakri, was later recruited and sent to Iraq.
Egypt and Its Secret Relations with Israel
Muhareb also argues that historical circumstances made Egyptian-Israeli contacts a mutual necessity. Former Mossad director Meir Amit, along with several Israeli historians, revealed that secret negotiations took place in 1965.
At the time, Egypt was deeply involved in Yemen, where approximately 70,000 Egyptian troops were deployed, limiting its readiness for war. Meanwhile, Syria’s Ba‘athist government was urging military confrontation with Israel, placing pressure on President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who feared a sudden conflict.
A further catalyst was the arrest of Israeli spy Wolfgang Lotz in Egypt. Israel sought his release after he had been sentenced to life imprisonment. As a result, both sides found common ground for negotiations, mediated by a German intermediary.
The Egyptian side was represented by Major General Issam al-Din Mahmoud Khalil, who oversaw non-conventional weapons programs within the Egyptian military and was closely associated with Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer. In January 1966, Khalil traveled to Paris and met Mossad representatives, including Meir Amit.
The discussions covered Lotz’s case, Israel’s desire for commercial access through the Suez Canal, aerial activity over the Straits of Tiran, and Egypt’s support for Fatah. Egypt, in turn, requested a reduction in Israeli military pressure, an end to Israeli support for royalist forces in Yemen, and a $30 million Israeli loan to be channeled discreetly through an intermediary bank.
Amer reportedly went even further by suggesting that the time had come to invite Meir Amit to Cairo. A secret invitation was indeed extended. The Israeli government convened an emergency meeting to consider the proposal but ultimately rejected it. Israeli leaders viewed such a visit as contrary to their strategic objectives, as they were already preparing for a military confrontation with Egypt while simultaneously expanding their armed forces and advancing their nuclear program.
According to Muhareb, Israeli experts subsequently drafted assessments addressing two questions: Why should Israel avoid making peace with Egypt, and under what conditions would peace be acceptable? The resulting documents concluded that any peace agreement must preserve Israel’s military superiority and alter the regional balance of power. In practical terms, an acceptable peace would diminish Egypt’s influence in the Arab world and limit its regional role.
Muhareb observes that, twelve years later, the Camp David Accords effectively fulfilled the same conditions that Israeli planners had outlined during the Amer-Amit negotiations.
As for whether Gamal Abdel Nasser knew about these contacts, Muhareb notes that Israeli documents contain no indication of a power struggle between Nasser and Amer and therefore assumed that Nasser was aware of the negotiations. Muhareb himself, however, considers it more likely that Nasser was not informed.إ
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