Syria… The Absent Political Duty
Dr. Burhan Ghalioun
Political discourse in Syria today is almost monopolized by two opposing camps united by extremism and divided by hostility. The first sees any criticism of the government’s choices as a betrayal of the revolution and a threat to the state, while the second believes that any hesitation in condemning its policies amounts to granting the regime additional time to consolidate its “Islamist” state and block any democratic transformation.
The first camp assumes that solutions to the country’s problems already exist in the mind of the leadership, and that all that is required is to allow it to work without interference. The second assumes that catastrophe is inevitable unless the international community is persuaded, by all means necessary, to intervene swiftly and impose a genuine pluralistic system, even if the price is an international mandate. In such a framework, politics disappears, inquiry ceases, war continues by other means, and the rhetoric of mutual incitement prevails.
Reality, however, is far richer in possibilities and choices. The social majority that initially welcomed the new regime did not hesitate, as mistakes accumulated, economic recovery slowed, the authorities became increasingly dependent on business elites, and fears grew over sacrificing vital sectors such as healthcare, education, and electricity in favor of “investors,” to take to the streets. They did so neither to reject nor affirm the regime’s legitimacy, but rather to defend their interests and livelihoods.
They realized that the battle of politics takes place in a much broader arena: engaging with reality as it is and striving to change it, not denying or glorifying it. In this arena, there are no ready-made truths or final facts; all realities are the product of human action. This is the essence of politics. War alone overturns reality from one extreme to another. In politics, however, change is produced through struggle and “dynamic interaction,” as described in the Qur’an, between rulers and ruled, oppressors and advocates of freedom, businessmen and workers, merchants and consumers, rich and poor. Within this ongoing interaction, politics takes shape.
Yet politics, unlike war, does not depend on the will of a single side, but on the effectiveness of both. There can be no politics when the authorities close off political participation to others, nor when the opposition adopts a strategy of total confrontation. Politics first requires mutual recognition of the legitimacy of the issues under dispute, agreement on the rules of competition, and a sufficient degree of trust and transparency between rivals and partners alike.
Politics offers no guaranteed outcomes, no certainty of success, and no assurance that sacrifices will yield proportional gains. Objectives may be achieved partially, or the process may end in deadlock, estrangement between rulers and opposition, or a return to overt or covert conflict. These are all possible outcomes in any political struggle. Still, politics, long absent in Syria due to the decades-long war between society and the regime, has returned to the public sphere. It is now being shaped in public squares, through media and social platforms, and even within the corridors of power themselves, rather than in prisons, security chambers, or through foreign interventions.
This return, however, remains extremely fragile. Consolidating it requires efforts from all parties to reduce tensions and prevent violence, especially as both domestic and foreign actors who fear peace and stability seek to reignite conflict. This demands a serious and sincere return to dialogue, one that allows all sides to express their fears, doubts, perspectives, and disagreements openly, at least until what is discussed publicly outweighs what remains hidden. Absolute transparency is impossible in politics; otherwise, conflict would not exist. Yet no meaningful political practice can emerge without a minimum degree of honesty and openness.
A democratic culture and its values must therefore be promoted, alongside the principle of managing diversity and disagreement within society before it can be imposed upon the state itself.
The first step toward building a genuine political sphere is to move away from fearmongering, suspicion, accusations, and the manufacturing of false causes, toward rational debate capable of dispelling doubts and redefining unresolved issues with clarity and transparency. But the essential condition for building a vibrant and productive political arena is the existence of collective political actors capable of articulating and defending the concerns of their constituencies, enjoying public trust, and possessing the competence to lead political struggle. Such leadership requires vision, organizational ability, legitimacy, and the authority to speak on behalf of society.
This is where political parties, trade unions, and civil society organizations derive their importance. Syria still lacks such structures because of the deliberate destruction they suffered over previous decades, as well as the new authorities’ fear that their re-emergence might obstruct the consolidation of their rule and the implementation of the program they consider best suited to rescuing the country from devastation and conflict.
Indeed, this political vacuum is what renders the Syrian situation so fragile. At the level of the “street,” there is scarcely any organized force capable of claiming to represent public aspirations or lead popular movements. The protests witnessed in recent months have largely been spontaneous, lacking clear leadership, organization, or recognized structures capable of coordinating activities, unifying demands, prioritizing objectives, and formulating a coherent agenda.
Such spontaneous mobilizations, even when encouraged by influential individuals or major events, remain temporary. They do not generate lasting political experience, nor do they help produce leaders with sufficient legitimacy and moral authority. The same applies, to some extent, within the ruling camp itself. Although the current alliance has succeeded in unifying competing factions around a single political and ideological nucleus, tensions and internal struggles persist.
Within the ruling establishment, there is a conflict between two concepts of leadership and authority. The first is traditional, where the leader is merely the foremost among a group of influential figures with equal standing. The second is modern, where the presidency functions as an institutional office governed by clear legal hierarchies, responsibilities, and limits of authority. This contradiction perhaps explains the ambiguity, secrecy, and reluctance to engage openly with external actors, including acknowledging the legitimacy of opposition itself.
In both camps, opposition and government alike, Syria remains trapped in a state of political “boiling” that prevents the emergence of a stable political sphere capable of producing coherent social projects, practical programs, and realistic timelines. Outsiders cannot directly alter the internal balance of power. Yet the possibility of influencing it in favor of the people’s aspirations depends on society’s ability to organize itself into an attractive political force capable of uniting diverse currents into a democratic platform or popular bloc where liberals, socialists, leftists, and Islamists coexist around a single principle: defending fundamental freedoms and broadening public participation through independent unions, political parties, freedom of expression, and pluralistic media.
In parallel, democratic culture and values must be cultivated within society itself. Pro-democracy forces should not wait for the authorities to grant them space to practice their ideals. Instead, they must themselves establish democratic platforms and forums for dialogue, thereby demonstrating that democracy is not a rigid ideology reserved for certain elites, but a political and legal framework for managing diversity and disagreement.
Through such experiences, skeptics within both government and opposition may come to see that dialogue is capable of overcoming divisions and producing practical compromises, and that violence and armed conflict are not the easiest path toward satisfying legitimate yet competing aspirations.
In this sense, democracy ceases to be an abstract concept or a ready-made system awaiting implementation from above. It instead becomes a living process shaped intellectually and practically through society’s struggle to overcome its internal divisions and defend its rights and freedoms. Through this dual struggle, people learn that freedom is a responsibility rather than merely a privilege, and that before being a political system based on elections, separation of powers, and the rule of law, it is fundamentally a culture grounded in human dignity, equality, and the rejection of exclusion and marginalization.
Recognizing the sovereignty and role of the people is essential to the legitimacy of authority, while educating, organizing, and empowering society are prerequisites for the legitimacy of the opposition itself.
Ultimately, Syria faces two choices: either continue the politics of confrontation and wait for democratic change to descend from above—whether through the authorities or foreign intervention—or work toward reviving and organizing social forces capable of imposing reform and correcting state policies from below. The first path is a dangerous gamble whose most likely outcome is fragmentation and chaos. The second seeks to unite efforts around building the social and political structures necessary to restore balance between state and society.
This was the argument I presented in my book A Manifesto for Democracy (Arab Cultural Center, Casablanca, 2006), whose first edition will mark its fiftieth anniversary at the end of this May.
There is no guarantee that a strategy of mobilizing and unifying society around a democratic—or semi-democratic—vision will succeed. Yet it can never be considered a waste of time, because it revives society from political paralysis, reintroduces it into the struggle for dignity and rights, and rebuilds it as an active civic force capable of shaping its own destiny.
By contrast, betting on internal chaos or foreign intervention may conceivably succeed, though the chances are slim. But failure—which is far more probable—would almost certainly lead to the country’s collapse, the spread of sectarian and ethnic militias, the destruction of what remains of the state, the eruption of multi-front wars, and intensified foreign intervention, ultimately destroying the Syria we cherish for a very long time.
This warning is directed at the government no less than at its opponents.
Originally published in Al-Araby Al-Jadeed.
