Syria… The Absent Political Duty
Dr. Burhan Ghalioun
It is stirred by the internal turbulence within the mentioned pattern of authority and leadership, including the clear recognition of the right to opposition and the very existence of opposition itself.
In both cases—opposition and authority—we are faced with a state of “boiling” within the spheres of power and opposition that prevents the establishment of a stable field of political practice, and inhibits the creation of political forces capable of formulating a vision for a clear and feasible social project, with a program, action plan, and timetable for implementation. No one from outside these ranks can directly influence the adjustment of power balances and transformations. However, the potential to influence and steer it in a direction that aligns with the aspirations of the general population depends on the street’s ability to emerge from this state of boiling, form a center of attraction for mobilized elements, and transform them into active participants alongside the authority/state, where differing sensitivities converge and unite to form a significant current or coalition: a popular pole, a platform, a forum, or a democratic alliance, in which liberals and socialists, leftists and Islamists coexist within a single-item program—the defense of fundamental freedoms and the expansion of popular participation through strengthening the independence of unions, the formation of political parties, and the freedom of opinion and pluralistic media.
In the same context, it is necessary to disseminate a culture of democracy and its values, and to embody the principle of managing plurality and difference within society before it imposes itself on authority and transforms into a foundation for state governance.
This means that forces advocating for democracy should not wait for an initiative from the authorities to implement their ideas; they must begin now by setting an example for both the authorities and the public, establishing the democratic pole or forum themselves and turning it into a framework for public dialogue that the Syrian people have not yet been able to achieve.
In this way, opposition figures who are only united by the desire for pluralism and participation in power provide evidence that democracy is possible—not as a rigid doctrine or a privilege reserved for certain social or cultural elites, but as a political and legal framework for managing differences, and for conducting dialogue effectively to reach realistic and acceptable positions and solutions, and to mature them. This experience can serve as proof for skeptics—many of whom exist in both government and opposition—of the validity of this approach, and demonstrate that dialogue can overcome divisions and conflicts, find effective solutions and compromises, and that conflict, violence, and fighting are not the easiest paths to satisfying legitimate and competing demands and aspirations.
Thus, democracy does not remain an abstract idea, nor a ready-made and complete system waiting for the gracious authority to adopt and implement it. Instead, it is intellectually and practically formed in the struggle of the people themselves to overcome their divisions and contradictions, just as in their struggle with authority in defense of their rights and freedoms. In this dual struggle, everyone learns that freedom is a responsibility, not merely a grant or personal benefit, and that it is, before being a political option encompassing the emergence of authority through elections, the rotation of power, separation of powers, and the rule of law, a culture, values, and principles led by the belief in the competence of all people, their right to a dignified life, and the rejection of exclusion, discrimination, and both moral and material marginalization. Just as engaging the people and recognizing their role and sovereignty is a basis for the legitimacy of authority, educating, organizing, and qualifying them to be active and mindful of their interests is a condition for the legitimacy of opposition and its empowerment.
In conclusion, we face two choices: to continue infighting, positional battles, and dreaming of democratic change coming from above—either from authority or the international community—which I call “revolutionary politics,” or to work on reviving and reorganizing societal forces to impose change and reform authority’s plans and policies. The first is a high-risk adventure, likely leading to the country’s disintegration and descent into chaos. The second involves pooling efforts to pave a broad path that allows the widest social base to cooperate and show solidarity, while building social frameworks and forces that establish a balance still entirely missing between state/authority and society/people. This is what I emphasized in my book Statement for Democracy, whose 50th anniversary of the first edition we will celebrate at the end of May (Dar Ibn Rushd, Beirut 1976).
It is not certain that a strategy of mobilizing society and uniting it around a democratic or semi-democratic vision will succeed, but it will never be a waste of time, as it will help extract society from its debris and political inertia, involve it in the struggle for its rights and dignity, and rebuild itself as a vibrant, active civil social force, equipping it with the means to defend its rights and participate in determining its destiny.
Conversely, betting on internal chaos or foreign pressure and interventions might succeed, albeit with a very slim chance. However, its failure—which is far more likely—will undoubtedly lead to the country’s explosion and fragmentation, the spread of sectarian and ethnic militias, the dismantling of what remains of the state, triggering a multi-front war, opening the door for interventions by many neighboring and distant foreign powers, and ending Syria as we have long cherished it.
This warning is addressed to the government as much as to its opponents.
(Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed)
